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Abstract
In this paper, I hypothesize that players with less than six years of experience, thus not able to pursue free
agency, face monopsony power in terms of their contracts. Furthermore, I believe that players with less than
six years of experience have lower salaries than players with the same MRP and more than six years of
experience. The arbitration process, I hypothesize, does not rid players with less than six years of experience
from monopsonistic behavior. Through this research I hope to measure the impact of monopsony power on
baseball players with less than six years of experience to gain a better understanding of the baseball market.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol13/iss1/11
21The Park Place Economist, Volume XIII
I. INTRODUCTION
The market for Major League Baseball(MLB)has been researched and explored for decades.One subject of controversy deals with the fair-
ness of the arbitration process.  While this process
was developed to try to help players receive fair con-
tracts, a simple question arises:  Is this process elim-
inating monopsonistic behavior?
When baseball players sign multimillion dol-
lar contracts, the general public tends to raise an eye-
brow and wonder if a single person is worth millions
of dollars to simply play a game.  Fortunately for
baseball, statistics showing player’s productivity are
easy to measure and readily available.  Therefore,
economic analysis of the baseball market is permissi-
ble.
Baseball players do not just randomly receive
high salaries.  Owners
receive revenue based
on player’s performanc-
es, and owners pay play-
ers based on these rev-
enues.  In economic
terms, owners try to
measure a player’s marginal revenue product (MRP)
of each player before assessing a salary.
In the baseball market, arbitration-eligibles
and free agents try to retain salaries which reflect
their MRP of the previous year.  While free agents are
free to sign with any team in the league, arbitration-
eligibles must negotiate with their respective team.
Therefore, all players in baseball are not in a truly
competitive market.
In this paper, I hypothesize that players with
less than six years of experience, thus not able to pur-
sue free agency, face monopsony power in terms of
their contracts.  Furthermore, I believe that players
with less than six years of experience have lower
salaries than players with the same MRP and more
than six years of experience.  The arbitration process,
I hypothesize, does not rid players with less than six
years of experience from monopsonistic behavior.
Through this research I hope to measure the impact of
monopsony power on baseball players with less than
six years of experience to gain a better understanding
of the baseball market.
II. ARBITRATION PROCESS
Before jumping into the literature and models
of baseball, it is imperative to discuss the basic char-
acteristics of Major League Baseball.  Before base-
ball arbitration began in 1974, players were drafted
onto a team and were not able to test their “market
value” by negotiating contracts with other teams.
Typically, one owner held
the rights to a player and
thus had monopsonistic
power over him.
Consequently, owners
often paid players well
below their marginal rev-
enue products (Frederick, 1992). 
In response, players formed the MLB arbitra-
tion process in 1974 to try and regain market power.
Final-offer arbitration (FOA), as it is formally
known, is set up to give players a chance to increase
their salaries before they are able to file for free
agency. Through this process, a player with three to
six years of experience is eligible for arbitration.  If
they choose to file for arbitration, the player and his
team file a “bid” for the player’s salary.  While the
case is waiting to be heard, negotiations between the
two sides are encouraged.  If a negotiation cannot be
developed, a hearing is held, and a neutral third party
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arbitrator will hear each side’s final offer and then
choose one of the offers (Frederick, 1992). 
It is safe to assume that “arbitrators act out of
self-interest and a desire to keep their positions”
(Frederick, 1992).  Since it is important for both play-
ers and owners to feel that their cases will be handled
fairly, arbitrators should not show favoritism toward
either side.  Since the institution of this process,
Dworkin (1981) indicates
that the final results have
been even.  Of the cases
which have been filed,
the results are split
between the players and
the owners.  Experts
believe that, overall,
arbitrators have done a
fairly good job balancing the outcome of the arbitra-
tion cases.
III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
To be able to measure the impact of the arbi-
tration process on player’s salaries, it is first impor-
tant to develop a model to measure player productiv-
ity.  In The Value of Sports Talent, Rodney Fort
(2003) concludes that a general Marginal Revenue
Product model is ideal (Fort, 2003).  Under this theo-
ry, a player’s salary can be determined based on pro-
ductivity measures of a player (Fort, 2003).
In baseball, different statistics are readily
available to measure player productivity.  Andrew
Zimbalist (1992) argues that productivity (PROD),
also known as OPS, which adds a player’s on-base
percentage ((hits + walks + hit by pitches)/ (at bats +
walks + sacrifices + hit by pitches)) and slugging per-
centage (total bases/at bats), is the best measure of a
hitter’s productivity.  At the time, Slugging
Percentage was generally used to measure player pro-
ductivity.  However, Zimbalist (1992) believes that
while Slugging Percentage “is a good indicator of
offensive performance, it excludes one major compo-
nent of offensive contribution, walks” (Zimbalist,
1992).  Therefore, OPS should be used because it not
only takes into account power statistics, but also
walks.
Alan Schwarz (2004) agrees with Zimbalist
that OPS is the best statistic to measure a hitter’s pro-
ductivity.  As Schwarz explains, this statistic “meas-
ures the key areas of offensive production: getting on
base and advancing runners” (Schwarz, 2004).  As he
further explains in his article, looking at SLG without
OPS “is like subsisting on food without water”
(Schwarz, 2004) because both are necessary.
Will Irwin (2003) takes another approach to
measure offensive productivity by using a Runs
Created (RC) variable.  He argues that this variable
“eliminates some of the team bias that is implicit in
(offensive) data” (Irwin, 2003).  Runs Created, as
Irwin indicates, “gives
one player more credit
than another when each
run is scored” (Irwin,
2003).  Therefore, play-
ers are measured for
their offensive produc-
tion to the team. 
Phillip Miller
(2000) conducts both a theoretical and empirical
comparison of negotiated salaries determined in
baseball’s free agent system to those determined in its
final-offer arbitration system.  In his work, Miller
concludes that there is a difference in the salary struc-
ture for arbitration eligibles and free agent players
(Miller, 2000).  Also, while he finds out that there is
a significant positive relationship between the
salaries of free agents directly affecting the negotiat-
ed salaries of arbitration eligibles, Miller concludes
that the systems do not determine equal salaries for
players with the same MRP (Miller, 2000).
Marburger (1996) uses MRP models to test
salary with respect to years of experience.  In his
study, he concludes that experience is in fact signifi-
cant when determining a player’s salary (Marburger,
1996).  Furthermore, he concludes that players with
more than six years of experience, thus able to freely
sign with any team, are subject to salaries closest to
their marginal revenue products.  This supports the
notion that the arbitration process does not fully elim-
inate monopsonistic behavior.
IV. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This study makes use of the human capital
theory, which states that players should be compen-
sated based on certain productivity measures.  Since
productivity is possible to measure in baseball, this
theory is applicable to this research.  Salary is there-
fore determined by certain productivity measures.
This research also makes use of the monop-
sony model.  This model is shown in Figure 1.
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In this market, there are several sellers of
service (players), but there is only one buyer (own-
ers).  Therefore, the cost for each additional unit pur-
chased raises MFC above the supply curve.  In an
arbitration system, the two wages submitted to the
arbitrator would be bounded by the two constraints
on the monopsony model: w* and wo.  Wo represents
the lowest wage that would cause a player to supply
labor to baseball.  W* represents the player’s MRP
which he could expect in the free agent market.  If
arbitrators have evenly dispersed the number of win-
ners between owners and players, the “average” wage
would fall between these two constraints.  Therefore,
arbitration eligibles still face monopsonistic power
because their actual wage is less than their MRP.  In
this research, it is this decrease in wage below w*
which is trying to be measured.
V. DATA
This model uses strictly outfielders because
these individuals generally have the highest offensive
production numbers.  Consequently, their salaries
generally reflect offensive production.  The first sam-
ple consists of 228 outfielders who were granted free
agency and signed a new contract between 1990 and
2003.  This sample represents players who have more
than six years of experience who can sign with any
team.  Therefore, the wages of these players closely
represent their productivity.  Table 1 lists the vari-
ables and descriptive statistics for free agents.
The second sample consists of 19 outfielders
who applied for and received a hearing in the arbitra-
tion process.  This sample represents players with
three to six years of experience who are not able to
sign with a new team.  Therefore, the salaries of these
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FIGURE 1:
Monopsony Model
 
  
TABLE 1 
Variables and Descriptions (Free Agents)    
Predicted 
Sign Statistic  Name Definition Mean Max Min Std. Dev. 
                
  Dependent             
  Variable             
                
  SAL Salary Value of Contract  $2,373,403  $15,341,857  $150,820 $2,475,762 
                
  Independent              
  Variable             
      Games Played          
+ GP Games Played  before contract  115 163 11 29.9 
      was awarded          
                
+ OPS (PROD) OPS (PROD) Slugging % +  778.69 1378 376 109.7 
      On-base %         
                
      (Hits+walks) *          
+ RC Runs Created  (Total Bases) /  56.7 209 0 31.2 
      (Plate Appearances)          
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players are the result of some monopsony power.
Table 2 lists the variables and descriptive statistics for
arbitration players: (TABLE 2)
It is important to note that players who sign
pre-arbitration contracts are excluded because of data
constraints.  These players generally sign out of high
school or college and do not have readily available
statistics to measure their productivity.  Therefore,
only arbitration-eligibles and free agents who sign a
contract are used.
For each player, offensive statistics as well as
games played from the year prior to signing a new
contract or filing for arbitration is used.  For example,
if a player signed a new contract in 1992, the offen-
sive statistics from 1991 are used.  These statistics are
used because owners will use previous offensive pro-
ductivity measures to determine the value of each
player.  Also, the salaries are computed into 2003 dol-
lar figures using the CPI index.  Therefore, all dollar
values should be interpreted in 2003 dollar figures.
These statistics can be found on www.base-
ballreference.com or www.espn.com.  To find data
for players who have either filed for arbitration or
free agency, www.roadsidephotos.com is an excellent
site and was used for this study.  This website offers
a complete list of players filing for free agency and
arbitration as well as the year in which this was done.
VI. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
This study researches and measures the
impact of monopsony power on baseball players with
less than six years of experience.  To measure this
impact, the research uses four simple linear regres-
sions by using ordinary least squares (OLS).  Each
regression assumes that salary is determined through
basic human capital theory.  Also, each regression
makes use of MRP theory.  This indicates that salary
is determined by productivity measures.  Lastly, each
regression is “structured” the same so a meaningful
comparison of coefficients can be done.  This will
allow for an insightful measure of the monopsonistic
impact on arbitration-eligibles. The dependent vari-
able for each regression is salary. In the two equa-
tions, the independent variables will be the produc-
tion variables OPS and RC.  The control variable,
Games Played (GP), is included to measure another
dimension of the player’s contribution to the team
during the year.  
The first set of equations makes use of the
OPS productivity measure.  With this productivity
measure, the Equation 1 is used:
SAL = β1 + β2 OPS + β3 GP + ε (1)
I will run Equation 1 separately for both the arbitra-
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TABLE 2 
Variables and Descriptions (Arbitration)    
Predicted 
Sign Statistic  Name Definition  Mean Max Min Std. Dev. 
               
 Dependent              
 Variable             
               
 SAL Salary Value of Contract  $2,433,659 $6,557,377  $496,999 $1,593,898 
               
 Independent              
 Variable             
     Games Played          
+ GP Games Played  before contract  136.2 162 67 29.4 
     was awarded          
               
+ OPS (PROD) OPS (PROD)  Slugging % +  778.5 971 631 89.8 
     On-base %         
               
     (Hits+walks) *          
+ RC Runs Created  (Total Bases) /  74.4 119 19 32.3 
     (Plate Appearances)          
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tion-eligible players and free agent players.  Again,
this is done to measure the monopsonistic impact of
the arbitration process.
The second set of equations makes use of the
RC productivity measure.  With this productivity
measure, Equation 2 is used:
SAL = α1 + α2 RC + α3 GP + ε (2)
I will run Equation 2 for both the arbitration-eligible
players and free agent players.  Just as with the OPS
productivity measure, this is done to measure the
monopsonistic impact of the arbitration process.
VII. RESULTS
The results for the first set of equations using
the OPS Model are found in Table 3. As shown in
this table, the hypothesis that arbitration-eligible
players with less than six years of experience, thus
not able to pursue free agency, face monopsony
power in terms of their contracts is supported.  A one-
unit increase in OPS for a free agent results in an
Andrew Tarman
TABLE 3 
Regression Results (OPS Model)  
Dependent Variable       
Statistic       
SAL Free Agents Arbitration-Eligible 
Independent Variables        
Statistic Coefficients  T-statistic Coefficients  T-statistic 
OPS 11,001 9.540 *** 6,177 1.974    * 
GP 29,171 6.900 *** 31,223 3.265 *** 
R Square 0.459 0.513 
Adjusted R²  0.454 0.453 
Sample Size  227 18 
Values in parentheses are absolute t -statistics     
  *   indicates significance at the .10 level     
  **  indicates significance at the .05 level     
  *** indicates significance at the .01 level        
TABLE 4 
Regression Results (RC Model)  
Dependent Variable       
Statistic       
SAL Free Agents Arbitration-Eligible 
Independent Variables        
Statistic Coefficients  T-statistic Coefficients T-statistic 
RC 78,053 18.448 *** 45,271 3.022 *** 
GP -18,575 4.210 *** -8,602 -0.523 
R Square 0.698 0.615 
Adjusted R²  0.695 0.567 
Sample Size  227 18 
Values in parentheses are absolute t -statistics     
  *   indicates significance at the .10 level     
  **  indicates significance at the .05 level     
  *** indicates significance at the .01 level        
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$11,001 increase in salary.  However, a one-unit
increase in OPS for an arbitration-eligible player
increases salary by $6,177.
The regression results for the RC model are
found in Table 4. These
results also support the
hypothesis that arbitra-
tion-eligible players face
monopsonistic power in
terms of their contracts.
A one-unit increase in
RC for a free-agent play-
er is accompanied by a
$78,053 increase in
salary.  However, the
same one-unit increase
in RC for an arbitration-
eligible player results in
only a $45,271 increase
in salary.  
As Irwin (2004)
predicted, this trend
should exist based on the
human capital theory.
However, it is important
to note that the sign for
GP in this model is not
what was predicted.
After running correla-
tion tests regarding these
two variables, it is
apparent that a signifi-
cant correlation problem
exists.  These tests are
shown in Table 5 and
Table 6. As a person
increases their games
played, their respective
RC variable increases.
This is due to the fact
that more games played
results in more at bats.  Since RC is influenced by at
bats, more games played will have a positive effect
on RC.  RC is flawed because it is not a standardized
variable.  Therefore, this model may not be desirable
for this application.  
To put these results into perspective, Table 7
is presented including all of the arbitration-eligible
players who received a new contract: (TABLE 7)
Included in this table is the name of the play-
er who filed for arbitration, their actual salary, the
predicted salary had they been a free agent using both
the OPS and RC models, and their respective produc-
tivity measures.  To determine the predicted salary,
each player’s respective
productivity measures
were plugged into the
predicted free agent
models (OPS and RC).
As this table
indicates, 14 out of the
18 players who filed for
arbitration would have
received a higher salary
had they been free
agents using the OPS
model.  Also, 11 out of
the 18 players would
have received a higher
salary had they been a
free agent using the RC
model.  Just as Miller
(2000) explained in his
research, these players
face monopsonistic
behavior in terms of
their respective con-
tracts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The results of the
regressions and analysis
indicate that players with
less than six years of
experience, who must
consequently use the
arbitration process, face
some monopsony power
in terms of their salaries.
The productivity vari-
ables comparing the two
markets clearly show that the players face two differ-
ent equations.  The slope to OPS and RC almost dou-
bles for players who are free agents, signifying that
monopsony power still exists for arbitration-eligible
players.  
Miller (2000), Marburger (1996), and this
research signify that only players with more than six
years of experience will receive salaries closely
reflecting of their MRP.  This is true because only
Andrew Tarman
TABLE 5 
Correlations (Arbitration)  
  rc 
Games 
Played 
Pearson 
Correlation  1 .859(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
rc 
N 19 19 
Pearson 
Correlation  .859(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
Games Played  
N 19 19 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 -tailed).  
 
TABLE 6 
Correlations (Free Agent)  
    rc 
Games 
Played 
Pearson Correlation  1 .727(**)  
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
rc 
N 228 228 
Pearson Correlation  .727(**)  1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
Games Played  
N 228 228 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 -tailed).  
 
“14 out of the 18 players who filed
for arbitration would have received
higher salary had they been free
agents using the OPS model.”
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these players can freely “shop” their value on the
market.  Also, Table 7 clearly shows the relationship
between arbitration salaries and free agent salaries.
In more than half of the cases for each model, OPS or
RC, players in an arbitration market with the exact
same productivity measures as players in a free agent
market would have received a higher salary in a free
agent market.
Certain issues regarding the arbitration
process still arise.  In future research, the relationship
to an arbitrator’s decision may be explored.  Since
research shows that arbitrators split their decisions
among the owners and players, a model to determine
the best coefficients which predict a player winning
the arbitration process would be beneficial.
Future research could also explore the rela-
tionship between arbitration-eligible players and free
agent players for all positions.  If models could depict
MRP for all players, a more accurate depiction of the
market could be developed.  Expanding these princi-
ples to pitchers, for example, could be explored to see
if position players and pitchers face different market
powers.
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